China and Democratization
The Economist has a long and interesting post mulling over why China remains an undemocratic country. The whole piece is worth a read, but particularly thought-provoking is the contention that China and Vietnam may have stumbled upon a sort of "sustainable authoritarianism"; that is, one without nepotism, regular succession, and regular economic growth.
A few extra things worth considering about China:
- The Chinese government runs a very effective propaganda apparatus that inculcates the idea that China's success is due to the Party's leadership and that democratic countries are susceptible to political and economic instability.
- The vast majority of Chinese people receive no formal education beyond the Party-implemented state system, never travel abroad, or ever encounter independent media in their lives. Thus, their exposure to ideas beyond the Party's control is minimal.
- China isn't capitalist in the same way traditionally capitalist societies are; state control over the economy remains common, and no Chinese succeed in business without the acquiescence, support, and (often) co-optation of key government officials.
- For some reason, the Chinese largely believe that government corruption is due to a "few bad apples" in the Party hierarchy rather than intrinsic to the system of government itself. The majority of the population hasn't yet made that conceptual link between "local Party official A is a corrupt criminal" and "he's corrupt because of perverse incentives and a lack of accountability"
As the piece points out, the Chinese and Vietnamese models can't be exported; the Communist Parties in those countries retain legitimacy through their role in unifying and stabilizing their countries after an extended period of war and chaos.
But the example of Egypt is worth remembering. Nobody I know of thought in late 2010 that within a few months the Mubarak regime would be thrown out of office in a revolutionary uprising. It wouldn't surprise me if people spoke of the CCP's resilience right up until the moment it collapses.
Liberals, Conservatives, and Open-Mindedness
At Marginal Revolution, Tyler Cowen asks his readers whether self-identified conservatives are more 'closed-minded' than self-identified liberals.
To me, the answer is quite plainly yes, and not only because I am a liberal who dislikes conservative values. Once upon a time, the conservative movement actually contained useful ideas about domestic, economic, and foreign policy that provided an intellectual balance to liberalism. This balance no longer exists, in large part due to conservatism's abandonment of intellectualism.
What has happened over the past generation is that the conservative movement has effectively embraced anti-intellectualism as its guiding creed. This began with the election of Ronald Reagan as President and has reached its apotheosis with the rise of Sarah Palin. In the conservative mind, Palin's lack of knowledge and expertise are virtues rather than liabilities. Her very simplicity makes her somehow more authentic.
This dislike of intellectualism has led conservatives to adopt an essentially reductionist set of policy ideas. Economic policy? Cut taxes and everything will be fine. Environmental policy? Drill baby drill. Foreign policy? Perpetual war, uber-patriotism, obsessive veneration of the military, and other fascist trappings. Domestic policy? Guns and God. That's basically about it.
A generation ago, when conservatism still had intellectual integrity, the answer to Cowen's question might have been 'no', or at least 'not necessarily'. Nowadays closed-mindedness isn't just a characteristic of conservatism, it's a principle.
Send Obama to the Countryside
The big news in China these days is the ongoing visit of President Barack Obama, who met with students in Shanghai Monday and with President Hu Jintao in Beijing yesterday. Nothing earth-shattering is expected to happen during Obama's visit and in all likelihood both sides will simply utter the same platitudes that have characterized recent Sino-American relations.
Unsurprisingly, Shanghai and Beijing were chosen as the only two stops on Obama's agenda, and in my recollection not since President Clinton's mid-90s visit to Xi'an has an American president deviated from these two cities on his China journey.
If I could influence Obama's itinerary, I'd schedule him for at least a half-day in one of China's innumerable rural villages. He wouldn't even have to go very far. A short drive from Shanghai into rural Anhui Province would suffice.
In the villages Obama would see how the majority of Chinese people actually live. He could then understand what motivates these villagers, what hopes and dreams they have, or how they perceive the future. I suspect he would come away from such a meeting with a very different perspective on modern China than he has surely taken from meetings with government officials and elite students in Shanghai.
Obama too might be better prepared than most Presidents to empathize with the locals he would meet. Unlike his predecessor, Obama spent several years living outside of the United States. Indonesia in the late 1960s and early 1970s was characterized by a similar degree of income inequality and rural poverty that today defines China.
Americans have a tendency to view China as a major, competitive power and an equal adversary. China sees itself as an ordinary developing country keen to mind its own business. The truth lies somewhere in between.
But by restricting his visit to only the nation's marquee cities I fear Obama might not have gained a very balanced portrait of what this country is really like. With a relationship as vital as the Sino-American one such a skewed perspective may ultimately prove disadvantageous and even dangerous.
Final Election Thoughts
Four years ago at this time I sat in Lianyungang, China, constantly searching for the latest polling data and hoping, against my gut-feeling, that somehow John Kerry would pull it out. This year, I'm still in China, now in the slightly more hospitable city of Kunming, hoping the exact same for Barack Obama. There are, though, a few differences between this year and 2004. There are more reasons for optimism; few expect Obama to lose. Furthermore, I feel that I back Obama because I want him to be president more than I don't want his opponent not to be president. Four years ago, I just wanted Bush gone; now, I want Obama in.
A confession. I didn't vote in 2004, and won't again this year. This isn't a principled decision, but rather a reflection of a busy lifestyle and the inherent difficulty of obtaining and processing absentee ballots from inland China. In the presidential election, my vote likely won't tip the scale as California is a safe Democratic state. Yet I do want to urge all of my American readers to vote, and to vote wisely.
My top reasons for supporting Barack Obama:
1. A repudiation of the anti-intellectualist strain of the American right, exemplified by President Bush and Governor Sarah Palin. These two figures believe that knowledge and expertise are dangerous, that intelligence is elitist, and that ignorance is virtuous. As someone who lives in a country in which these sentiments (repudiation of civilization, intelligence, and learning) caused massive misery and destruction as recently as forty years ago, this stands out as my top reason for opposing the Elephant ticket. (No, I don't think Palin and Bush are on par with Chairman Mao, but the similar disdain of intellectualism is a chilling parallel).
2. A foreign policy tilted toward engagement and internationalism. Neo-conservatives (of which McCain largely is one) subsist on the fantasy that the US won the Cold War by telling Mikhail Gorbechev to "tear down this wall", and that negotiation with enemies represents "weakness" or "appeasement". This is absurd and ridiculous, and our policy of brinkmanship has only strengthened regimes we hoped to isolate and weaken. McCain seems to relish regenerating an adversarial relationship with Russia and China, two important powers with whom the US relationship is far more important than with states such as Georgia and Ukraine. Obama isn't perfect on this score (he supports the ridiculous inclusion of the two latter states into NATO, for instance) but he would be far more reasonable on these questions of foreign policy.
3. A commitment toward fostering middle-class growth. Nominal GDP growth in the US has belied the fact that middle-class wages (adjusted for inflation) have stagnated since the mid 1970s. Obama's embrace of a tax and spend regime reveals an understanding that the backbone of American prosperity is in the growth of opportunity and economic security of the middle-class, not the spectacular earnings of CEOs.
4. Skin-color. I'm a little uncomfortable with this rationale, as one's skin color or ethnic heritage ultimately has very little to do with his capacity to govern. Then again, an Obama victory would symbolically present a diverse, dynamic America in which swarthy men (and women) with funny names are not excluded from obtaining the highest office in the land.
There are many who would find my reasons spurious or disagreeable, and hey- that's fine. I do believe, however, that electing Barack Obama is in the best interests of not only liberal Democrats but of the United States as a whole.
Censorship
Jeremiah writes:
Ah the vicissitudes of a government petrified of information€¦after a brief revival this past week, blogspot is YET AGAIN blocked in Beijing. This time joined by the popular workaround site anonymouse which has, until now it would seem, been a decent way to access blocked sites. Hopefully this is all temporary and somebody will get the nanny a cocktail and a neck massage.
But for the moment can I just address (again) the purple elephant sitting in the corner: societies that block information and are afraid of alternative viewpoints cannot be considered modern and developed€¦and no amount of high rise buildings, synchronized hand claps, Audi A6s, or Olympic games will make it so.
Sorry.
Amen. Blocking blog hosting software only scratches the surface of media censorship in China. I used to read the China Daily until its sycophancy became depressing, and while TV news broadcasts are good for Chinese listening comprehension they don't convey much in the way of useful news. Chinese people brave enough to challenge official government policy on virtually any issue usually end up silenced if not incarcerated.
As Jeremiah writes, the booming economy and increasingly cosmopolitan nature of the country do not mask the fact that China remains a rigid, authoritarian dictatorship that is completely controlled by one unelected political party. Admission of this fact usually elicits feeble excuses, such as that China is somehow "different" and that Chinese people are somehow not ready for participatory democracy or a free press. Some go so far as to say that authoritarian systems "work better", belying the fact that most dictatorships crumble under the weight of their own inefficiency. China's impressive growth has been in spite of its government, not because of it.
Some months ago I read Sam Harris' anti-religion cri de couer "The End of Faith". Drawing on an impressive command of epistemology, Harris argues that some ideas are better than others regardless of context. For instance, he writes that religions that practice "honor killings" are inferior to those that do not, and that atheism (or scientific rationality) ranks higher than religious faith of any kind in the hierarchy of ideas.
Whether or not one agrees with Harris' take, I do believe that his rejection of relativism can be extended into the political sphere. Societies that allow freedom of information, protect individual rights, and limit governmental power are inherently more humane and vibrant than those that do not. I do not mean to endorse a violent overthrow of the Chinese government, but am merely pointing out that despite its glowing facade, China remains, in many ways, a deeply backward country.
A caveat or two: I would totally oppose any effort from the United States, United Nations, or any other country to attack China in order to change its political system. China's sovereignty ought to be respected, just like those in nations whose institutions we may find more admirable.
More Democracy In China Musings
There's quite a good thread going now at The Peking Duck, in which I've thrown my hat in, wondering when China will liberalize its political system and become a "democracy". What struck me about the comments was not only the level of disagreement over what China can and should do but also what democracy itself means.
This confusion is understandable, as democracy is complex. There isn't a one-size-fits all definition, after all. And that, my friends, is why basing one's foreign policy on the vague notion of "democracy promotion" has been such a disaster.
China Thought Experiment
Let's imagine that tomorrow Hu Jintao announces that the Communist Party will disband and China will adopt a Canadian-style parliamentary system of government. Henceforth, China will allow multiple political parties to compete in regular elections, with the winners forming a coalition government. Meanwhile, the nation will adopt an American-style bill of rights enshrining press freedom and other individual liberties. An independent judiciary is created and sustained. Immediately, China's political class forms new parties and selects party leaders in advance of nationwide elections.
How would this (extremely far-fetched) scenario play out?
Nobody knows, least of all an amateur China-hand like myself. But here's what seems to me to be a somewhat likely breakdown of the different parties that would emerge from the rubble of the Communist dictatorship.
There would likely be a highly militaristic, nationalistic party led by senior members of the Chinese military. This group would promote a confrontational foreign policy, adopt an aggressive posture toward Taiwan, and beat back Japanese efforts to establish regional hegemony. Ties with both Europe and the US would strain, while efforts to extract material wealth from African nations would accelerate. Domestically, this party would promote Chinese national pride and traditional Confucian values. Party leaders would rail against the liberalization of Chinese culture, as well as creeping Westernization. In economic policy, the party would work toward limiting Chinese unemployment by greatly enhancing the military-industrial complex. In terms of history, the Nationalist party would be staunch defenders of the Communist era and object to revisionism. Let's call them the Nationalist Party
There would also be a party composed of the moderate technocrats who guided the overhauling of China's political system. In many ways, they would govern in the manner of the formerly ruling Communists, balancing robust growth with environmental-protection legislation and attempting to stave off unrest in the countryside. Their foreign policy would be less hawkish than that of the Nationalist Party but they would be loath to make concessions toward Japanese intransigence or Taiwanese independence. While they would continue to forge ties with so-called "rogue" states, they would nonetheless cooperate on international initiatives such as the crisis on the Korean peninsula. Ties would remain cordial, if not warm, with the US and other Western countries. In dealing with China's past, the party would neither oppose nor promote efforts to scrutinize the errors of the Communist Party. In fact, most of the party leaders would have been former Politburo members themselves. Let's call this party the Centrist Party.
The third party to emerge would be a party composed of liberals, led by elites with significant experience overseas and supported heavily by university students. They would be the most aggressive in protecting the newfound individual rights of the Chinese people, and would welcome mixing traditional Chinese values with those from abroad. Their foreign policy would be geared toward achieving rapproachment with the Japanese and Taiwanese, and they would not necessarily intervene if Taiwan were to declare independence. In addition, they would be open toward calls for autonomy and independence with both Tibet and Xinjiang, and would be harshly critical of errors made in the recent Chinese past. In economic terms, the party would promote further integration with the global economy as well oppose efforts to protect Chinese workers from the vagaries of privatization. Let's call them the Liberal Party.
The fourth national party would be composed of representatives of both the rural poor and the urban migrant population. They would support a socialistic economic policy in which full employment would take precedence over growth, and would halt the spread of globalization and privatization within China. On foreign policy, this worker's party would be largely isolationist, believing that China should focus on solving its own problems. They would be socially conservative and nationalistic, yet strongly anti-elitist. Their first act of power would be to implement a highly progressive tax policy and a lofty minimum wage for China's workers. They would have sympathies with Marxism and vociferously denounce China's reform and opening policies. Let's call them the Labor Party.
There would also be a small Green party focused entirely on environmental protection, a Maoist party, and various other fringe national parties on both the left and the right. In addition, there would be many smaller parties organized along ethnic lines, with the most vocal and powerful being a Uighur Party and a Tibetan Party. These two parties, in turn, would have both pro-integration and pro-independence factions that could potentially split into separate parties themselves.
Confusing. How would it play out?
The dominant party would clearly be the Centrist Party, and so the Chinese prime minister would likely be a former Communist official; perhaps Hu himself. They would likely form a stable coalition with the Nationalist Party but would occasionally break and work instead with the Labor Party. Representatives from these three parties would comprise the lion's share of the Chinese parliament, with the Liberal Party remaining a distinct minority and the smaller parties having only token membership. In many ways, the ruling Centrist Party would govern in much the same manner as their Communist predecessors, continuing policies enacted in the Reform and Opening era.
On the surface, a democratized China would likely behave in the same way that the current authoritarian party would, begging the question: why bother with political reform at all? Certainly, a re-organization of China along these lines could have some troublesome consequences. The possibility of a bloody civil war between Uighurs and/or Tibetans and the Han leadership would be high, and there could be other divisions that would disrupt social harmony. Cities could become embroiled in conflict as migrants battle for their rights, and a nascent labor movement could interfere with government plans to liberalize the economy. As many defenders of China's authoritarian government point out, overnight democratization could make things much worse.
Then again, there would be clear benefits to political liberalization. A free press would be better able to expose government corruption and hold China's leaders accountable. Freedom of speech and expression could ignite a burgeoning artistic scene, much as in Spain after Franco's death. Other reforms could make it easier for ordinary Chinese to travel abroad, start up a business, and change professions. Relaxed eminent domain policies would give people more leeway in opposing government plans to appropriate private residences for the purpose of building infrastructure. Environmental and health crises would be handled better in a freer climate.
This is complicated stuff, hence my decision to title this post as a "thought experiment" rather than as a modest proposal. I'd be curious to read criticisms of my interpretation as well as additional thoughts on the matter. Come on fellow political dorks. I know you're out there.
Is China Communist? If Not, Then What Is It?
In the midst of an interesting post on common misconceptions people have about China, the Humanaught writes that "communism is a farce", elaborating:
Most definitely the most overly-confused issue for Neverbeens as relating to China is the conflicting reports of capitalism running amok in what is the world's largest communist state. Now to set the record straight, China is - in no way, shape or form - communist. State-run monopolies are at a minimum, there are no mass socialistic programs (Canada's health care and welfare systems are more inclusive), and free enterprise is (somewhat annoyingly) rampant. It's 100% capitalistic, but under a one-party, authoritarian system.
I'm afraid that Ryan, in an effort to correct misperceptions among non China-hands, has unwittingly fallen for a misperception himself. While China may not be purely communist, calling it 100% capitalistic simply doesn't resonate with how the Chinese government and economy actually function.
Ryan correctly points out that Canada's health care and welfare systems are more inclusive, which in a strict sense is true. Rural Chinese and undocumented workers in cities lack access to benefits afforded to China's urban elite. I would argue, though, this is more a result of governmental incompetence than a policy shift toward market capitalism. Poor Chinese aren't looked after not because China's ruling elite is composed of privatization zealots but because its welfare system is a bloated, inefficient mess. In fact, one of the central tenets of the government's plan is based around building a "new socialist countryside" which would in theory bring welfare benefits to the rural poor. Whether they succeed or not is anyone's guess, but it could hardly be referred to as a deviation from socialism.
Canada is a small, wealthy country that has admirably constructed an inclusive and effective welfare state. China, if anything, would probably like to emulate Canada's example. Its inability to do so results from it being a developing country with a lousy government rather than anything related to ideology.
I'm also not convinced that free enterprise in China is "rampant", whether annoying or not. (I, for the record, happen to think the limited amount of free enterprise the Chinese do enjoy is the best thing to have happened to the country, but this is beside the point). People point to China's gaudy economic statistics and its proliferation of fancy cars, skyscrapers and Starbucks and conclude that the Chinese are running around in some sort of Randian free for all.
In fact, a friend of mine who works as a financial journalist told me that most of China's growth results from government-funded fixed-asset investment, such is in infrastructure. Very little of China's growth seems to stem from bottom-up initiatives, such as the proverbial American example of starting a billion-dollar computer business in your college dorm room. The government still directs much of China's economy from above and most of the winners of China's boom have strong connections to important government officials. Without these connections, it can be very difficult for the average Chinese to get ahead.
Given the government's role in shaping the economy, and its persistent ownership of much of China's industry, it's more than a little hyperbolic to call China's economy "100% capitalistic". Like virtually every other country on earth, China blends, or tries to blend, market capitalism with social welfare. But what makes China different from, say, North American or Western European countries is that its political leaders continue to rhetorically support Marxist ideals. The government has never repudiated communist tenets despite deviating from them, skirting this obvious contradiction between their words and deeds by altering the very definition of Marxism. For a true capitalist state with an authoritarian government, one can look at China's own Hong Kong or Singapore as examples, though I suppose one could argue that China would very much like to resemble these places some day.
I'm not trying to pick on Ryan, and I think his views on the matter are probably shared by a lot of other foreigners who live in China. One of the principal reasons for this confusion is that China's political and economic system is largely unprecedented in the world (although it is being copied elsewhere) and therefore not easy to define. I'd say the only correct way to answer someone's question about China's economic system is to shrug your shoulders and laugh.
The Respectable Bigot
Is The New Republic, a magazine so entrenched in Washington opinion journal circles that it was once referred to as "in-flight reading on Air Force One", owned and operated by an anti-Arab bigot?
All signs point to....yes. Glenn Greenwald presents the mercurial tale of one Marty Peretz, whose antipathy to Arabs extends all the way to their inferior vases and carpets.
SOTU Thoughts
I didn't watch the actual State of the Union Speech, as prolonged exposure to President Bush's semi-coherent ramblings gives me headaches. As a good citizen, though, I took the time to read his speech as well as Sen. James Webb's rebuttal.
A one-word reaction? Yawn. Aside from the proposal to reduce gas consumption, there was precious little new material to chew on. Iraq was obviously the elephant in the room and I found it telling that Bush waited until the second-half of his speech to mention the war. Once again, the president's take on the war seems to be this: "Iraq is a real shitstorm but if we leave, you and your family will be killed in a terrorist attack. So we can't leave".
'tis remarkable to think back to the 2002 SOTU. Bush, buffeted by greater than 80% approval ratings, confidently declared Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to be part of an "axis of evil" and made it clear that Afghanistan would not be the only battle in the War on Terror. Five years later, with his popularity hovering in Nixon/Carter territory (~30%), Bush lacks the political capital to do much about Iraq anymore, other than hope this "surge" idea bears fruit.