Matt Schiavenza From the Dragon to the Apple- A Sinophile in New York

More Democracy In China Musings

There's quite a good thread going now at The Peking Duck, in which I've thrown my hat in, wondering when China will liberalize its political system and become a "democracy". What struck me about the comments was not only the level of disagreement over what China can and should do but also what democracy itself means.

This confusion is understandable, as democracy is complex. There isn't a one-size-fits all definition, after all. And that, my friends, is why basing one's foreign policy on the vague notion of "democracy promotion" has been such a disaster.

China Thought Experiment

Let's imagine that tomorrow Hu Jintao announces that the Communist Party will disband and China will adopt a Canadian-style parliamentary system of government. Henceforth, China will allow multiple political parties to compete in regular elections, with the winners forming a coalition government. Meanwhile, the nation will adopt an American-style bill of rights enshrining press freedom and other individual liberties. An independent judiciary is created and sustained. Immediately, China's political class forms new parties and selects party leaders in advance of nationwide elections.

How would this (extremely far-fetched) scenario play out?

Nobody knows, least of all an amateur China-hand like myself. But here's what seems to me to be a somewhat likely breakdown of the different parties that would emerge from the rubble of the Communist dictatorship.

There would likely be a highly militaristic, nationalistic party led by senior members of the Chinese military. This group would promote a confrontational foreign policy, adopt an aggressive posture toward Taiwan, and beat back Japanese efforts to establish regional hegemony. Ties with both Europe and the US would strain, while efforts to extract material wealth from African nations would accelerate. Domestically, this party would promote Chinese national pride and traditional Confucian values. Party leaders would rail against the liberalization of Chinese culture, as well as creeping Westernization. In economic policy, the party would work toward limiting Chinese unemployment by greatly enhancing the military-industrial complex. In terms of history, the Nationalist party would be staunch defenders of the Communist era and object to revisionism. Let's call them the Nationalist Party

There would also be a party composed of the moderate technocrats who guided the overhauling of China's political system. In many ways, they would govern in the manner of the formerly ruling Communists, balancing robust growth with environmental-protection legislation and attempting to stave off unrest in the countryside. Their foreign policy would be less hawkish than that of the Nationalist Party but they would be loath to make concessions toward Japanese intransigence or Taiwanese independence. While they would continue to forge ties with so-called "rogue" states, they would nonetheless cooperate on international initiatives such as the crisis on the Korean peninsula. Ties would remain cordial, if not warm, with the US and other Western countries. In dealing with China's past, the party would neither oppose nor promote efforts to scrutinize the errors of the Communist Party. In fact, most of the party leaders would have been former Politburo members themselves. Let's call this party the Centrist Party.

The third party to emerge would be a party composed of liberals, led by elites with significant experience overseas and supported heavily by university students. They would be the most aggressive in protecting the newfound individual rights of the Chinese people, and would welcome mixing traditional Chinese values with those from abroad. Their foreign policy would be geared toward achieving rapproachment with the Japanese and Taiwanese, and they would not necessarily intervene if Taiwan were to declare independence. In addition, they would be open toward calls for autonomy and independence with both Tibet and Xinjiang, and would be harshly critical of errors made in the recent Chinese past. In economic terms, the party would promote further integration with the global economy as well oppose efforts to protect Chinese workers from the vagaries of privatization. Let's call them the Liberal Party.

The fourth national party would be composed of representatives of both the rural poor and the urban migrant population. They would support a socialistic economic policy in which full employment would take precedence over growth, and would halt the spread of globalization and privatization within China. On foreign policy, this worker's party would be largely isolationist, believing that China should focus on solving its own problems. They would be socially conservative and nationalistic, yet strongly anti-elitist. Their first act of power would be to implement a highly progressive tax policy and a lofty minimum wage for China's workers. They would have sympathies with Marxism and vociferously denounce China's reform and opening policies. Let's call them the Labor Party.

There would also be a small Green party focused entirely on environmental protection, a Maoist party, and various other fringe national parties on both the left and the right. In addition, there would be many smaller parties organized along ethnic lines, with the most vocal and powerful being a Uighur Party and a Tibetan Party. These two parties, in turn, would have both pro-integration and pro-independence factions that could potentially split into separate parties themselves.

Confusing. How would it play out?

The dominant party would clearly be the Centrist Party, and so the Chinese prime minister would likely be a former Communist official; perhaps Hu himself. They would likely form a stable coalition with the Nationalist Party but would occasionally break and work instead with the Labor Party. Representatives from these three parties would comprise the lion's share of the Chinese parliament, with the Liberal Party remaining a distinct minority and the smaller parties having only token membership. In many ways, the ruling Centrist Party would govern in much the same manner as their Communist predecessors, continuing policies enacted in the Reform and Opening era.

On the surface, a democratized China would likely behave in the same way that the current authoritarian party would, begging the question: why bother with political reform at all? Certainly, a re-organization of China along these lines could have some troublesome consequences. The possibility of a bloody civil war between Uighurs and/or Tibetans and the Han leadership would be high, and there could be other divisions that would disrupt social harmony. Cities could become embroiled in conflict as migrants battle for their rights, and a nascent labor movement could interfere with government plans to liberalize the economy. As many defenders of China's authoritarian government point out, overnight democratization could make things much worse.

Then again, there would be clear benefits to political liberalization. A free press would be better able to expose government corruption and hold China's leaders accountable. Freedom of speech and expression could ignite a burgeoning artistic scene, much as in Spain after Franco's death. Other reforms could make it easier for ordinary Chinese to travel abroad, start up a business, and change professions. Relaxed eminent domain policies would give people more leeway in opposing government plans to appropriate private residences for the purpose of building infrastructure. Environmental and health crises would be handled better in a freer climate.

This is complicated stuff, hence my decision to title this post as a "thought experiment" rather than as a modest proposal. I'd be curious to read criticisms of my interpretation as well as additional thoughts on the matter. Come on fellow political dorks. I know you're out there.