China’s Sphere of Influence
Robert Kaplan has an interesting article up at The Atlantic concerning Beijing's relationship with its far-western province, Xinjiang. In the text, he touches upon an issue that occasionally flies under the radar in international coverage of China:
As China's zone of influence expands westward, a network of north-south roads through Pakistan, India, and Burma will one day connect both Xinjiang and Tibet with ports on the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, economically liberating landlocked inner China. A new Silk Route will form, in which Lhasa will be linked with Kolkata, Kashgar with Karachi, and so on.
Here in Kunming, China's massive investment in international road and rail links will change the face of the city within the next ten or twenty years. Before long, it will be possible to drive from Kunming to Calcutta or Kunming to Bangkok on modern, high-speed roads. As Kaplan notes, these transport links will fuel economic expansion to southwestern and western China, regions that have been slow to share in the coastal provinces' economic prosperity.
I was chatting to a friend the other day about East Asia's two "rogue states": Burma and North Korea. He said that each problem will eventually resolve itself, as both countries will eventually become client states of China. In one sense, they already are: China's imports of Burmese timber helps prop up the latter's sagging economy and China is the only significant global power with any ties at all to North Korea. My friend believes that before long both the Kim family and the Burmese junta will be taking orders from Beijing.
Whether or not my friend's prophecy comes true (and I suspect it might), I do believe that one of the major global trends in the next few decades will be a realignment toward great powers having regional "spheres of influence". China isn't necessarily a great power yet; its military and economic strength are no match for fully developed countries; but its rise as the regional power in East Asia is inevitable.
What does this mean for the United States? Its military and economic dominance will not wane for some time, but in the (somewhat) near future the American moment of unipolarity will undoubtedly recede. The US has based its foreign policy since the Cold War on being the global hegemon, leading a network of friendly, secular liberal democracies in its new world order. This policy has led to an overstretched military and ill-advised wars against regional tyrants, hardly the best use of US resources or power.
A consequence of relative US decline vs. the rise of China and the EU may be a stable series of spheres of influence, with each power having a controlling stake in its periphery. As for China, this may mean they will have to compromise in places such as Africa in order to exert greater hegemony in Taiwan, Burma, North Korea, and other neighboring places.
June 20th, 2008 - 16:46
“My friend believes that before long both the Kim family and the Burmese junta will be taking orders from Beijing.”
Yep, because they’ll be in Beijing.
The overthrow of the Burmese junta will see an anti-China backlash, and a German-style reunification of Korea would see a hyper-nationalist, US-allied state bordering China. And Korea has some big post-colonial chips on its shoulders- anti-China and anti-Japan, with the complication of US occupation of the South since WW2. Much as Koreans may prefer China to America, they ain’t about to kowtow.
And let’s not forget that what’s surprising about both the Burmese and North Korean regimes is how long they’ve lasted- especially Burma, which was once one of Asia’s richest countries, and that wasn’t that long ago. Neither regime is even remotely sustainable.
June 21st, 2008 - 02:41
Robert Kaplan’s piece is so typical of his and western reportings of China in general. As usual, it is hypocrisy-ridden. Bad treatment of Uighurs and Tibetans and other ethnic minorities? This coming from an American is just amazing.
China can take page from America’s playbook when it comes to wiping out, assimilating and integrating ethnic minorities.
June 22nd, 2008 - 21:26
Chris,
Many people talk about North Korea and Myanmar being client state of China. I am baffled. Why? How? Neither Naypyidaw nor Pyongyang is taking orders from Beijing, at least not in the same way Tokyo or London does from Washington. The fact that China exerts heavy influence in the junta and the Kim dynasty does not automatically make them China’s client states. Both have often snubbed Beijing. In the case of Myanmar, when the monks protested and Beijing reportedly appealed to the junta for greater restraints, a plea that was ignored. Like any other Korean, Kim Jong-il is fiercely nationalist. He does not trust foreigners, Chinese included. Beijing had wanted the nuclear crisis to go away, yet Kim gave Beijing the middle finger by conducting two nuclear tests. Beijing labelled the tests “brazen”.
Japan and the UK take orders from the US. Their policies are much more coherent with those of Washington. American interests are extremely important to both countries. You don’t see any of the above in China/North Korea or China/Myanmar.
June 23rd, 2008 - 18:27
Pfeffer, what? I did not accuse either Burma or North Korea of being client states of Beijing. But those two regimes have precious few friends in this world. When the shit hits the fan and they’re looking around for a safe place to go into exile, Beijing is going to look a lot more comfortable than New York or London.
And the UK and Japan take orders from Washington like Burma and North Korea take orders from Beijing.
June 25th, 2008 - 04:26
Chris,
Exactly how does Myanmar or North Korea take orders from Beijing? When was the last time they coordinated with Beijing, like London and Tokyo always do with Washington?
June 25th, 2008 - 08:56
Pfeffer, read what I wrote.
June 25th, 2008 - 11:34
Greetings:
I think you are both right. Economic cooperation among nations, while preserving some degree of cultural separation is the backbone of the European Union. And increasingly, these kinds of economic alliances are not reserved to the european community. Mercosur in South America is another example of this kind of emerging cooperation.
As for the US, we’re practically toast. China’s gdp will exceed ours within 10 years or so at the current rate of growth. We’ve sold our manufacturing base down the tubes. The so-called service economy is looking more and more like a shell game. China, not without her own outsized problems, is financing our increasingly desabilizing deficit. And our influence on our own continent is slipping badly as much of central and south america is abandoning the neo-liberal economic model in favor of what can only be called a more socialist one.
Call me a pessimist, but it doesn’t look good here on the home front.
June 25th, 2008 - 16:27
Pfeffer,
Are you really arguing that the relationship between Japan and the UK with the US is essentially the same as China with Burma and North Korea? Economically speaking, this is pretty clearly untrue. I posited that Beijing’s dominant role in NK and Burma’s economies could transfer to politics, and Chris wrote why he thinks this is unlikely.
In any case, I don’t see why a comparison to the US/UK/Japan situation merits mention here. I realize you are extremely sensitive to Western bias toward China, but in some instances it is really irrelevant.
John,
China will pass us in ten years? That’s the earliest estimate I’ve heard by a longshot. I agree, though, that the US position vis a vis the rest of the world is weakening, but I’m not sure this is such a bad thing, particularly in the case of Latin America.