Matt Schiavenza From the Dragon to the Apple- A Sinophile in New York

19Feb/085

China and Kosovar Independence

The world's club of independent nations added Kosovo to its members list this week, to decidedly mixed applause. The US, Britain, France, and Germany immediately recognized the new republic, while Spain ruled out following suit. Serbia, having seen its territory further reduced, is incensed. Its long-time patron Russia also opposed the independence declaration, while other countries have thus far remained on the sidelines.

One such country of course is China, whose reaction has merely been to express "grave concern" and to call for a solution more congenial to Serbia's interests. Beijing did not say whether or not it would recognize Kosovo, although my sense is that this is extremely unlikely. China falls into a category of countries concerned that Kosovar independence might inspire their own separatist movements to emulate its example.

This issue dovetails with a discussion I'm having with commenter Marco in this thread about China's Janus-faced relationship with imperialism. Beijing has long denied harboring imperialist intentions itself, pointing out that China was a victim of foreign domination in the century prior to the founding of the People's Republic. This cannot be swept aside: China was intimidated, carved up, bullied, and ultimately occupied by a number of imperialist powers, an experience that has not been forgotten.

That aside, what does China make of its historical behavior in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia? In each case, China appropriated ethnically separate territories under its own control, brutally suppressed any dissent and encouraged Han settlement in order to dilute the native proportion of the population. Beijing's flatters itself by claiming its significant material investment in each region has greatly improved the overall quality of life, and to an extent this is true. Yet were the Japanese to claim that their occupation of China in the 1930s and 40s represented an altruistic attempt to develop the country, all Chinese would be up in arms.

Nowadays, these issues are largely moot. Turkic people in Xinjiang comprise but a minority of their own autonomous region, and Han settlement in Inner Mongolia has been so thorough that they now represent 90% of the province's population. Tibet's situation is rather more complicated, but even their exiled supreme leader (the Dalai Lama) has ceased calling for independence. In other words, China lacks a breakaway region on par with Kosovo.

And as for Taiwan? Its parallels with Kosovo are rather slim. One of Kosovo's strongest claims for independence was its ethnic distinctiveness from Slavic Serbia: 95% of the Kosovar population is ethnically Albanian. Taiwanese people are predominately Chinese. And while Kosovars endured a brutal suppression by Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian army, Beijing has mainly left Taiwan alone since 1949. The international community has largely united behind the mainland's One China Policy, and few countries still recognize Taiwan as China's rightful government.

So China is left in a pickle. Recognize Kosovo, and it leaves itself susceptible to claims of hypocrisy. Denounce the new country, and it then has to fend off questions of why an ethnically homogeneous country should be at the whim of an aggressive, dominant foreign power. As a result, I sense that "gravely concerned" will be Beijing's official policy for awhile.

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  1. Interesting post, Matt, but I disagree on a couple points.

    First, I think there IS a parallel between Kosovo and Taiwan: Russia — and probably China — are going to “Taiwanize” Kosovo by denying it recognition in the UN and other multinational bodies where they have enough pull. Look for Russia to coerce any smaller countries (read: non-EU members) that extend diplomatic courtesies towards Kosovo in the near future, much as China pressured LDCs to sever relations with Taipei. The end result in response to this isolation will probably be a Kosovar union with Albania even though such a union is illegal according to Kosovar law.

    Second, the main thrust of your argument relies on us recognizing Kosovo as a country instead of what it really is — a majority-Albanian province of Serbia or a “lost” Albanian territory — and I just don’t see China agreeing on this point. In fact, Kosovo arguably lacks the resources necessary to be a truly independent country, and even its political identity is wedded to Albania (for instance, Kosovars prefer waving the Albanian flag to the flag of Kosovo). Moreover, I hope you’re not saying that because Kosovo is dominated by the Albanians it therefore deserves to be a country, because that’s a dangerous precedent to set. I won’t put words in Yang Jiechi’s mouth, but it doesn’t take much to see that the Chinese will interpret Kosovar independence as a violation of Serbian sovereignty and argue that it invites all manner of separatism and irredentism. And you know what, they might be right.

  2. “Denounce the new country, and it then has to fend off questions of why an ethnically homogeneous country should be at the whim of an aggressive, dominant foreign power.”

    And that foreign power is the US of A? It can’t be China since it is neither aggressive nor dominant.

    By the way Matt, Kosovo is not homogeneous, it has got 10% of so ethnic Serbs. I guess they can seek independence too. :-)

    Seriously, I think China has no choice but to recognize Kosovo. China is neither aggressive nor dominant, and this is the price she has to pay for not being so.

  3. Pfeffer,

    The aggressive, dominant country in this case is Serbia, not America or China, and while there is a small Serbian population in Kosovo (I’ve heard it’s more like 5%) I’d still say Kosovo is ethnically distinct enough to warrant special autonomy, especially in regards to recent history.

    Matthew,
    Yes, you’re right- it is a dangerous precedent to set, although I feel that in the case of Kosovo (and other parts of what was once Greater Serbia) their persecution under Belgrade warrants special consideration.

    I agree that a union with Albania is likely, although that would only occur I think after most the rump Serb population in Kosovo migrates to proper Serbia, which is something I would expect to start happening immediately.

  4. Migration to Serbia proper? Yeah, maybe, I mean, a lot of Serbs left after the NATO campaign, but Kosovo takes such a prominent place in Serb nationalist myth-building, as the site of a huge and important battle against the Ottomans (I remember it as the Serbs lost, but a recent report I read said they won) that I would not be surprised to see a Serb nationalist movement to resettle Kosovo, or at least those parts still dominated by Serbs, to defend the Motherland and their Brother Serbs, or whatever.

    And actually, I think the West is far too quick to play up the “poor, oppressed Albanians” and downplay the Serb claims to Kosovo.

    Again, this is based on stuff I read years ago and have mostly forgotten: I’ve read that the Albanian settlement of Kosovo and Serb migrations to “Serbia proper” began only after WW2. Could well be wrong on that, and I don’t want to start researching it now when I’m supposed to be studying Chinese…

    As for Taiwan: I suppose the “native” Taiwanese (those Han and Hakka whose ancestors settled Taiwan beginning in the late Ming/early Qing) could claim a history of oppression under the “Mainlanders” of the KMT…. It’s a stretch comparing it to Kosovo, but still, I wouldn’t be surprised if they try it.

  5. Good points on the historical reality of Kosovo, Chris. What also sickens me — and I supported the war in Kosovo — is that because of the “poor Albanians narrative,” no media reports about Kosovar independence today mention that the KLA committed ethnic cleansing after NATO forced Milosevic out of Kosovo. Kosovo might well be 95% Albanian today, as Matt writes, but it used to be 82% Albanian — the rest were Serbs and Montenegrins.


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