Burma and China
While Burma's* recent uprising is a purely internal affair sparked by rising fuel prices, some Asia observers have begun wondering if, or when, China will involve itself in the affairs of its neighbor. Should Beijing decide to intervene, we might see the first chinks in what has been China's successful international relations philosophy.
In the past five years China has positioned itself as the ideological opposite of the United States in foreign policy, a convenient position due to the globally unpopular Iraq War. Broadly put, China's mantra has been "stability". Any regime that supports Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, remains silent on issues of human rights, and allows Chinese companies access to its raw materials will have friendly relations with Beijing. China regards human rights issues as domestic concerns only, and has criticized the US for bringing up human rights as an issue in foreign relations.
Given China's support for stability and its indifference to democratic movements, Beijing naturally would prefer the junta to remain in power. A chaotic civil war would threaten Chinese business interests or possibly spill over into sensitive border regions here in Yunnan Province. In addition, the Communist Party might fear that a successful transition to a democratic regime (a so-called "Orange Revolution") would inspire China's own internal dissidents. China's interests in Burma would be for the protests to cease as peacefully as possible and for the status quo in Burma to continue.
Yet what if the Burmese do manage to topple the junta and establish a government less friendly to Chinese interests? Beijing would be faced with a dilemma: either respect its foreign policy norm by staying out of Burmese affairs, or using its status as an emerging global power and East Asian hegemon to force the Burmese to accede to its wishes. The latter action would elicit a harsh condemnation, something Beijing certainly doesn't want less than a year before the Olympics. Either way, what China decides to do (or not to do) will say a lot about its commitment to its very public non-interventionist rhetoric.
*Burma's official name is "Myanmar" but I've elected to use its original name throughout this post.
(Photo of monks in Burma by Reuters and featured in The Daily Telegraph)
September 26th, 2007 - 03:57
I don’t think the PRC will intervene should things develop in Myanmar in a way that will prove detrimental to Chinese interests. Not that I am saying losing Myanmar will not be a big deal, but the PRC will get over it and move on. Why? Because it is in no position to do so, both theoretically and practically. You are right, the PRC prides itself for being different from the US who interferes and invades from left to right, it is known for not interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs (with the exception of their “rights” to recognize Taiwan province). Hence the so-called “Beijing Consensus”. If this is ditched, what would the PRC be? Probably worse than the US. The PRC did nothing when color revolutions swept several central Asian countries; it is doing nothing now that the US is enlisting help from “allies” (read: lapdogs or “junior partners”) like Mongolia, Vietnam and India. A “democratic” Myanmar will likely to embrace the US, but what can the PRC do? They can’t send the PLA over to fight for the junta.
My hunch is the PRC will tighten its belt, grit its teeth and swallow the pain.